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abstract This article examines the shifting territorial goals of two of the most electoral-
ly successful and politically relevant nationalist parties in Spain: the Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco (PNV) and Convergència i Unió (CiU). Whilst both parties have often co-operated to 
challenge the authority of the Spanish state, their territorial goals have varied over time and 
from party to party. We map these changes and identify key drivers of territorial preferences; 
these include party ideology, the impact of the financial crisis, the territorial structure of 
the state, party competition, public opinion, government versus opposition, the impact of 
multi-level politics and the particularities of party organisation. These factors interact to 
shape what nationalist parties say and do on core territorial issues, and contribute to their 
oscillation between territorial accommodation and secession.  However, the way in which 
these factors play out is highly context-specific, and this accounts for the different territorial 
preferences of the PNV and CiU. These findings advance our understanding of persistent 
territorial tensions in Spain, and provide broader theoretical insights into the internal and 
external dynamics that determine the territorial positioning of stateless nationalist and 
regionalist parties in plurinational states. 
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Introduction
A defining feature of the stateless nationalist and regionalist party family 
(SNRPs)1 is their demand for some kind of self-government for a sub-state 
territorial community that is considered to be distinct in some way (for ex-
ample, based on linguistic, cultural or economic considerations).2 However, 
the precise nature of these parties’ territorial demands has always varied 
considerably, ranging from the protection of specific rights, to devolution, 
federalism or independence.3 In recent years, however, there is evidence of 
new shifts in these parties’ political priorities. On the one hand, an increasing 
number of SNRPs—for example, in places such as South Tyrol, Veneto, Wales 
and Galicia—have come to see independence as the only way to guarantee a 
sub-state territorial community’s control over its own affairs. Many of these 
parties have sought to advance this agenda by holding (often unofficial) inde-
pendence referendums, although not all have been successful in doing so. On 
the other hand, some SNRPs—such as the Flemish Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
(N-VA)—have pursued more pragmatic territorial strategies, whereby ambi-
tions to radically overhaul the territorial organisation of the state have been 
put aside in order to focus on other more pressing policy challenges (such as 
socio-economic issues) facing the territory in question. 
As a first step towards explaining these more recent shifts in SNRPs’ terri-
torial goals, this article examines and compares the evolving territorial pro-
jects of the largest nationalist parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia 
respectively, namely the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and Convergència 
i Unió (CiU). These cases exemplify the shifting territorial positions outlined 
This article is a result of a broader research project carried out thanks to the support provided 
by the University of the Basque Country (GIU 14/30), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness (HAR2015-64920-P) and the European Regional Development Fund. The 
research undertaken by Anwen Elias for this article was funded by the Nuffield Foundation 
(ref: NCF/36360).
1. As Hepburn, “Introduction”, 481, notes, a huge variety of labels has been used to define 
this group of parties. The terminology of ‘stateless nationalist and regionalist parties’ allows 
inclusion of parties that emphasize a more regionalist orientation, as well as those that define 
themselves as nationalists and claim to represent a specific national community. We use the 
term ‘nationalist’ to refer specifically to the Basque and Catalan parties examined here given 
that they fall into the latter category. 
2. See De Winter, “Conclusion”, 190.
3. Ibid, 191-93; Hepburn, “Introduction”, 484; Massetti, “Explaining”.
131 REAF núm. 25, abril 2017, p. 129-165
Between accommodation and secession: Explaining the shifting territorial goals of nationalist 
parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia
above. In recent years, CiU has moved from a moderate stance focused on 
accommodating Catalan distinctiveness within Spain to demanding Catalan 
independence; in contrast, the PNV’s long-standing ideological commitment 
to Basque independence has been played down to focus on implementing and 
broadening existing autonomy provisions and tackling the Basque Coun-
try’s economic problems.4 Existing work that has examined SNRPs’ territo-
rial goals and strategies provides the basis for developing hypotheses about 
the key drivers of these parties’ shifting objectives. These are then tested in 
an empirical analysis that draws on party documentation (e.g. manifestos, 
speeches), public opinion data and secondary academic sources. We argue 
that whilst both parties share similar interests (enlargement of self-govern-
ment) and face common challenges (the evolution of Spain’s decentralisation 
settlement, the financial crisis), a combination of external (territorial struc-
ture of the state, dynamics of party competition and multi-level politics, 
government vs. opposition, public opinion) and internal (party ideology and 
organization) factors have influenced territorial goals in different ways, and 
to different extents, in each case. The findings provide new insights into the 
complex ways in which SNRPs’ territorial goals are subject to a common 
set of external and internal pressures, which play out in party—and con-
text-specific ways. 
These findings also constitute an important contribution to our understand-
ing of territorial politics in Spain. Tensions over the territorial organization 
of political authority have been present within the Spanish state since its 
creation at the end of the 15th Century, as a result of the failure of suc-
cessive attempts at nation-building to integrate distinctive political, social 
and cultural communities within the state’s territory.5 From the nineteenth 
century onwards, managing this territorial dilemma became more difficult 
due to the emergence of strong Basque and Catalan nationalist movements. 
The ‘state of autonomies’ model of territorial relations outlined in the 1978 
Spanish constitution was considered by many scholars to have been relatively 
successful in containing Basque and Catalan demands for greater self-deter-
mination until the 1990s.6 Since then, however, the territorial organization 
4. See Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia”; Requejo and Sanjaume, “Recognition and 
political accommodation”; Martínez Riera and Zubiaga, “Nation and State Building”.
5. See Linz, “Early state-building”; Mees, “Rückständiges Zentrum, modern Peripherie”.
6. See, for example, Gunther et al., Democracy, 7.
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of the state has been challenged anew by nationalist actors in these two au-
tonomous communities, most recently in the form of Catalan demands for 
independence from Spain.7 
However, in spite of their key role in contemporary Spanish politics, there has 
been surprisingly little comparative study of Basque and Catalan nationalist 
movements. With two recent exceptions8, there has been little direct comparison 
of these two cases, and the limited literature that exists was mostly published 
over two decades ago.9 The analytical and methodological scope of these studies 
also varies considerably, with different emphases on the sociological, cultural 
and political contexts of nationalist mobilisation in both places.  More recent 
work has made a strong argument for the need to compare these two cases in 
order to understand the re-emergence of territorial tensions in Spain in recent 
years.10 This article takes up this challenge by identifying the key factors that 
have led two parties that at times have considered themselves to be allies in the 
struggle against the Spanish state, to espouse divergent ambitions for territorial 
re-configuration.
The article begins by drawing on scholarly studies of the SNRP phenomenon 
to formulate a set of hypotheses about the expected political, economic and 
intra-party determinants of these actors’ territorial goals. These are then test-
ed empirically through detailed case studies of the PNV and CiU from their 
establishment until the Basque regional elections of 25 September 2016. The 
article then proceeds to evaluate the explanatory capacity of the hypotheses, 
and identifies a set of common factors that, to different extents and in dif-
ferent ways, have shaped parties’ territorial goals and strategies. The article 
concludes by considering the significance of the findings for understand-
ing the on-going territorial tensions in contemporary Spanish politics, and 
SNRPs’ strategies in pursuit of territorial re-configuration in plurinational 
states more broadly. 
7. See Nagel, “Catalonia’s struggle for self-determination”.
8. Field, and Hamann, “Framing Legislative”; Gillespie, “Contrasting Fortunes”.
9. For example, Conversi, Basques, Catalans and Spain; Díez Medrano, Divided Nations; Ross, 
“Nationalism and party competition”; Guibernau, “Spain”.
10. Gillespie, and Gray, Contesting Spain?
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Explaining Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties’ 
Positioning on Territorial Issues
Whilst SNRPs have become a permanent feature of the political landscape in 
most West European democracies,11 in many places they have also become influ-
ential political players that have influenced the dynamics of party competition, 
government formation and policy-making.12 Whilst early studies of this party 
family focused on the cultural, economic and political conditions in which SN-
RPs emerged, subsequent scholarly effort has emphasised the political and (to a 
lesser extent) economic factors which have shaped the subsequent development 
of these parties. This work, and the broader literature on political parties on 
which it often draws, provides the starting point for formulating hypotheses 
about key factors expected to shape SNRPs’ shifting territorial goals over time. 
As noted in the Introduction, SNRPs have in common their shared demand for 
a reform of the territorial structure of the state in which they operate, in order 
to provide some kind of self-government for a distinctive territorial community. 
The exact territorial demands made by SNRPs reflect the particular centre-pe-
riphery conditions within which they have emerged, and this specific context 
furnishes them with a fundamental and enduring set of ideas about how the state 
should be re-organised.13 Whilst SNRPs rarely confine themselves to territorial 
issues,14 these core values serve as a touchstone of identification for party elites, 
members and voters. Venturing beyond them risks being seen as a betrayal of a 
party’s fundamental identity.15 A party’s core territorial ideology is thus expected 
to constrain the range of options for territorial re-structuring that an SNRP can 
credibly hold. 
SNRPs’ rootedness in the centre-periphery cleavage also constitutes a prism 
through which these parties interpret and respond to new policy challenges.16 
One recent such challenge is the financial and economic crisis, which has seen 
11. Hepburn, “Introduction”, 477.
12. Elias, and Tronconi, From Protest to Power, and “From protest”.
13. Elias, Minority Nationalist Parties, 148-150; Massetti, “Explaining”.
14. Elias, et al., “Position”.
15. Alonso, Challenging the State, 24.
16. Elias, Minority Nationalist Parties, 29.  
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the European economy experience its deepest recession since the 1930s.17 To date, 
scholars of territorial politics have not examined the implications of this 
crisis for SNRPs and their territorial projects in any detail. Nevertheless, it 
is widely accepted that historical disparities in economic development be-
tween peripheral territories and the centre, and opposition to the central 
government’s model of economic management, was a key driver of SNRP 
mobilisation in many plurinational states.18 Such disparities have often led 
SNRPs in relatively rich regions to denounce the transfer of regional resourc-
es to poorer regions via state re-distribution policies, whilst those in poorer 
regions have tended to criticise the state for failing to create the conditions 
for regional economic development.19 SNRPs which perceive that the recent 
financial crisis has had a negative impact on their territory’s economic status 
can thus be expected to give renewed emphasis to long-standing economic 
grievances, and make new demands for self-government on the grounds that 
this would empower the territory to propose a different path to economic 
recovery. 
However, whilst party ideology may provide the broad parameters for SN-
RPs’ territorial projects and goals, there is also substantial evidence that 
other shorter-term influences arising from the domestic political context 
within which these parties operate may also shape what territorial goal a 
party chooses to pursue. Crucially, “these may push and pull parties in a 
different direction… and may not necessarily fit in with the basic ideologi-
cal preferences of a party”.20 One such consideration is the extent to which 
SNRPs can claim exclusive ownership of the territorial dimension in party 
competition. For example, state-wide parties21 have shown themselves to be 
highly adept at developing their own territorial profiles in an attempt to 
undermine the appeal of SNRPs.22 There may also be competition from more 
than one regionalist party on the territorial issue dimension.23 In both cas-
17. European Commission, Economic Crisis.
18. Massetti, “Explaining”.
19. Massetti, and Schakel, “From Class”, 873.
20. Elias, Minority Nationalist Parties, 34.
21. Following Detterbeck, Multi-level Party Politics, 53, we define state-wide parties according 
to their territorial coverage; they are parties that are present organisationally and participate 
in elections in all, or nearly all, parts of the state’s territory. 
22. Mazzoleni, “Saliency of Regionalization”; Alonso, Challenging the State.
23. Massetti, “Explaining”, 515.
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es, the dynamics of party competition may result in a SNRP coming under 
pressure to shift its own territorial goals in order to distinguish itself more 
clearly from its rivals. 
Whether such a pressure results in a moderation or radicalisation of the 
party’s territorial ambitions, is expected to depend on several other contex-
tual factors. Firstly, public opinion towards different models of territorial 
re-organisation is expected to constrain the territorial options considered 
by SNRPs. Whilst it has long been recognised that political parties play a 
role in shaping voter preferences24, it is also the case that “parties seeking 
votes do not buck majority opinion”25 since doing so risks making them 
appear out of touch and irrelevant. We focus on the latter role of public 
opinion in this article, and expect SNRPs to think twice about adopting 
territorial positions that have little public support. Secondly, whether or 
not an SNRP aspires to enter government is also expected to have a bearing 
on the territorial goals it chooses to pursue. There is substantial evidence 
that office-seeking SNRPs have moderated their territorial goals in order 
to broaden both their electoral and coalition appeal26, whilst those that 
prefer to remain as opposition parties are in principle freer to espouse more 
radical options for territorial re-structuring.27 
Furthermore, SNRPs’ territorial demands are expected to be informed by 
opportunity structures derived from the territorial structure of the state 
within which these parties operate. In other words, decentralisation, and 
the creation and empowerment of a regional tier of government, is ex-
pected to incentivise SNRPs to shift their territorial preferences.28 This is 
because of the new opportunity structures opened up to SNRPs as a result 
of the creation of a new regional political space. For example, these parties 
have been shown to benefit electorally from voters’ preference for political 
parties with a strong regional profile in regional elections.29 As a result, 
SNRPs have often become important electoral players in regional party 
24. For example, see Bartolini, “Electoral and party competition”, 97.
25. Budge, “Theory and measurement”, 81.
26. Elias, “From marginality”; Elias, and Tronconi, From Protest to Power, 351-356.
27. Massetti, “Explaining”, 515. 
28. Toubeau, “Regionalist nationalist parties”, 429-30.
29. Jeffery, and Hough, “Regional elections”.
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systems, and this makes entering regional government a far more realistic 
prospect.30 State-wide parties faced with strong SNRPs in regional settings 
are also much more likely to enhance their own territorial profiles as sug-
gested above.31 Decentralisation is thus expected to increase the impact of 
factors such as dynamics of party competition and government incumbency 
on SNRPs’ territorial goals. 
Decentralisation may also, however, create new opportunities and con-
straints for SNRPs as a result of the multi-level nature of party systems 
in plurinational states, and the new vertical links between different levels 
of government that often emerge.32 SNRPs often operate in regional and 
state-level party systems simultaneously.33 Legislative and/or coalition agree-
ments with state-wide parties may allow SNRPs to secure new concessions 
on self-government. But co-operating with parties with very different terri-
torial priorities may also result in a pressure on SNRPs to shift or downplay 
their own territorial ambitions.
How are SNRPs expected to manage the tension between remaining true 
to core territorial values, and incentives emanating from their operating 
environment to shift their territorial position in a different direction? In 
their study of the party politics of territorial reforms in Europe, Toubeau 
and Massetti34 argue that power relations within political parties are a 
crucial determinant of “how structure and ideology determine the strategy 
that is adopted”. This is because political parties are rarely homogenous 
actors, but are composed of different coalitions of actors with different 
priorities; the balance of power between these competing power bases in-
fluences the strategic direction a political party takes.35 How SNRPs choose 
to respond to competing pressures on their territorial positioning will thus 
be conditioned by internal power relations, and which interests prevail in 
the process of selecting a territorial strategy to pursue.  
30. Elias, and Tronconi, “From Protest”.
31. Alonso, Challenging the State.
32. Massetti, “Explaining”, 512.
33. Elias, and Tronconi, From Protest to Power, 4.
34. Toubeau, and Massetti, “Party Politics”, 307.
35. Katz, and Mair, “Evolution of Party Politics”; Kitschelt, Transformation.
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Mapping the Shifting Territorial Goals of the PNV  
and CiU
The Origins and Evolution of the PNV and CiU
The PNV was established in 1895, and from the outset advocated the secession 
of the Basque territories from Spain and France and their re-constitution as an 
independent confederation.36 In subsequent years, this stance was moderated to 
demand a statute of autonomy for the Basque Country, a goal that was 
achieved in 1936 under Spain’s Second Republic.37 However, secessionist 
goals were never formally abandoned and the demand for restoration of the 
fueros (medieval institutions for self-government that had been abolished in 
the nineteenth century) was sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate both 
territorial positions.38 
The PNV’s dual territorial position remained unchanged during the period 
of the Franco dictatorship. However, a split from the party in 1959, and the 
creation of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) as a secessionist movement 
committed to using political violence to achieve this goal39, constituted a 
new pressure on the PNV’s territorial strategy from the 1960s onwards. For 
example, in discussions on the design of Spain’s new democratic institutions 
after Franco’s death in 1975, and in a context of ETA’s escalating political 
violence, the PNV argued that the only solution to the ETA problem was 
far-reaching self-government through “recovering the sovereignty contained 
in the system of the fueros”.40  In practice, however, this long-standing ideo-
logical goal was complemented by a more moderate discourse that supported 
Basque autonomy as a first step towards future sovereignty.41 
In contrast, CiU was established in 1978 as an alliance between two key 
actors in growing Catalan opposition to the Franco dictatorship during the 
36. Pablo, and Mees, Péndulo patriótico, 1-26.
37. Granja, Nacionalismo y II República.
38. Pablo, and Mees, Péndulo patriótico, 27-210; Mees, Nationalism, Violence, 9-20.
39. Elorza, et al., Historia.
40. Pablo, et al., Documentos, 151.
41. Pérez Nievas, “Modelo de Partido”. 
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1960s and 1970s, namely Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) 
and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC).42 CiU’s territorial goal was that 
of securing autonomy for Catalonia within Spain, and this was pursued via 
a strategy of negotiation with the central state. This “Spanish vocation of 
Catalan nationalism”43 had already been in evidence in previous years, with 
CDC’s Miquel Roca acting as the mouthpiece of Catalan and Basque nation-
alism in the process of configuring the new Spanish state (although the PNV 
also sought to exercise direct influence through bilateral meetings with the 
Spanish President, Adolfo Suárez).44 
This formal cooperation between CDC and PNV continued a tradition of 
collaboration between Basque and Catalan nationalism against a common 
adversary, the Spanish state, that can be traced back to the 1920s. However, 
this solidarity had always been, and would continue to be, little more than a 
symbolic gesture. Differences in ideological principles and strategic priorities 
limited the scope of political co-operation, and led the PNV and CDC (sub-
sequently CiU) to pursue different pathways to securing autonomy during 
the transition period. This divergence was evident in the referendum on the 
Spanish Constitution held in December 1978: whilst CiU voted in favour of 
a document that it had helped to draft, the PNV advocated abstention in 
an attempt to balance the party’s historical opposition to any kind of Span-
ish Constitution with the pragmatic recognition of the legal framework for 
achieving Basque autonomy on offer. 
1980 to Mid-1990s: The Consolidation of Spain’s ‘State of 
Autonomies’
From 1980 to the mid-1990s, CiU displayed remarkable strategic stability 
in pursuit of its territorial goal of accommodating Catalan distinctiveness 
within the Spanish state. This goal was summarised by Jordi Pujol, the alli-
ance’s leader during this period, in the following terms: “what we want is a 
statute of self-government… with a broad scope for making our own political 
42. Barberà, Alianzas Políticas.
43. Barrio, “Organización”, 320.
44. Ibid.
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decisions… rather than administrative decentralization which is controlled 
and continuously eroded”.45 
CiU’s autonomist strategy can be attributed largely to its electoral and politi-
cal hegemony within the Catalan political space during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Patterns of dual voting (where voters favour parties with strong territorial 
credentials in regional elections) and differential abstention (whereby voters 
of the largest state-wide party, the PSC, were more likely to abstain in regional 
elections) allowed the party to dominate the regional political space during this 
period.46 CiU also reaped electoral benefit from rival parties’ poor credibility 
as defenders of Catalonia’s interests. On the one hand, CiU’s main nationalist 
rival, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), struggled to define a distinc-
tive ideological profile and had limited electoral appeal as a result.47 On the 
other hand, the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) suffered from being 
associated with the attempts of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) 
in central government to centralise political authority in the mid-1980s.48 
Taken together, these electoral and party competition dynamics in Catalonia 
enabled CiU to occupy regional government between 1980 and 2003. From 
this position, the party had the resources and opportunities to implement and 
advance Catalan self-government within the framework of the Spanish state, 
and as part of a nation-building process.49 These achievements underpinned 
growing popular support for self-government during this period, with 70.6% 
declaring themselves to be satisfied with the operation of Catalan autonomy 
in 1992.50 
Further advances in enhancing self-government were made in the mid-1990s 
when state-wide parties lacked governing majorities in central government 
(PSOE from 1993-1996; Partido Popular [PP] from 1996-2000), and CiU’s leg-
islative support in the Spanish parliament allowed it to extract further conces-
sions on decentralisation. That such concessions on de-centralisation could be 
45. Pujol, Pensament polític, 25.
46. Riba, “Voto dual”.
47. Culla, Esquerra.
48. Guibernau, Catalan Nationalism, 80.
49. Lo Cascio, Nacionalisme i autogovern.
50. ICPS, Sondeig 1992.
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achieved reflected the broader constitutional context within which territorial 
dynamics took place. Whilst the ‘state of autonomies’ model for managing ter-
ritorial relations within Spain set out in the 1978 Spanish Constitution foresaw 
the decentralisation of political authority to Spain’s seventeen autonomous 
communities, questions about what and when competencies should be trans-
ferred were left to bilateral negotiations between regional and central govern-
ments.51 This provided a strong structural incentive for CiU to focus on the 
implementation and consolidation of Catalan autonomy during this period.52 
Finally, the stability of CiU’s territorial approach was also ensured by the lack 
of internal contestation of the alliance’s strategic direction by its component 
parties. CDC and UDC’s shared Catalanist vocation provided sufficient com-
mon ground for agreeing on a single territorial strategy, whilst other ideolog-
ical differences between them (CDC’s social democracy in contrast to UDC’s 
Catholic values)53 were deliberately played down in order to take full advantage 
of the political opportunities to implement Catalan autonomy.54 The centralisa-
tion of decision-making in the hands of the leaderships of CDC and UDC also 
served to deal with any intra-party tensions, whilst the charismatic personality 
and popularity of Jordi Pujol allowed him to transcend inter-party disputes and 
exercise strong strategic leadership at the helm of the Catalan government.55
In the PNV’s case, its territorial strategy during the transition period ap-
pealed to a wide spectrum of voters, and this contributed to it emerging 
as the Basque Country’s primary political force (with 38.1% of votes) in the 
first autonomous elections held in 1980.56 In this and subsequent regional 
elections, patterns of dual voting and differential abstention also bolstered 
the party’s regional electoral performance, albeit to a lesser extent than in 
Catalonia due to voters’ strong party identification, and therefore electoral 
loyalty.57 The party was also aided by the weak Basque profile of state-wide 
parties contesting regional elections, whilst ETA’s strategy of political vio-
51. Aja, Estado autonómico, 56-61.
52. Pujol, Tiempo de construir.
53. See Barberà, Alianzas políticas, 34-5.
54. Elias, “Catalan Independence” 85.
55. Barrio, and Barberà, “Convergència”, 85.   
56. Pérez Nievas, “Partido Nacionalista Vasco”, 103; Mees, “Nacionalismo vasco”.
57. Pallarés, and Keating, “Multi-level Electoral Competition”; Llera, Vascos y política.
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lence limited the electoral appeal of its political wing, Herri Batasuna (HB). 
The PNV entered Basque government in 1980, an office it retained until 2009. 
Just as for CiU, the broader constitutional framework provided a strong in-
centive from this point until the mid-1990s to implement the provisions of 
the Basque Statute of Autonomy approved by referendum in October 1979, 
although once again secessionist goals were never formally denounced. For 
example, in 1995 the party’s President, Xabier Arzalluz, declared that ‘a nation 
like the Basque one will never accept or recognize any sovereignty other than 
that of its own people’.58 
However, internal tensions over who and what territorial level had the au-
thority to determine party strategy, led to a split from the PNV in 1986.59 
Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), established as a social democratic and secessionist 
party, drew substantial support away from the PNV in the 1986 autonomous 
election, forcing the latter to seek new alliances in order to retain government 
office. The result was a period of coalition government between the PNV 
and the state-wide Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE)60 between 1987 and 
1998.61 In spite of periodic disagreements over the extent of autonomy that 
should be pursued, the coalition continued with the work of implementing 
the Basque Statute of Autonomy and served to consolidate the PNV’s moder-
ate and pragmatic territorial strategy. This successful experience of regional 
cooperation also paved the way for the PNV to support the minority PSOE 
government in Madrid between 1993 and 1996, which resulted in additional 
transfers of competencies to the Basque regional institutions. As with CiU, 
this support was also extended to the PP in 1996-2000. 
There were two other factors that contributed to the stability of the PNV’s 
territorial politics during this period. Firstly, it was consistent with the par-
ty’s strategy in relation to ETA, whose political violence escalated further 
during this period.62 This trend, combined with the attacks of extremist 
right-wing groups and state-led reprisals, made the fight against terrorism a 
58. El País, “Arzalluz reivindica”.
59. Pérez Nievas, “Partido Nacionalista Vasco”, 115.
60. In 1993, the PSE merged with the left-wing Euskadiko Ezkerra to form the Partido 
Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra (PSE-EE). 
61. This became a three-party government in 1994 when EA joined the coalition.
62. Mees, “Versión y gestión”, and “Nationalist politics”.
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priority issue for the PNV in regional government. In particular, the PNV 
was under constant pressure from state-wide parties to distance itself from 
the radical political goals and strategy espoused by ETA. It sought to do so 
by establishing a common democratic front against the paramilitaries, and 
this was a key element of the coalition agreement reached with the Basque 
Socialists in 1987. The resulting Pact of Ajuria Enea (1988) committed all 
Basque political parties (with the exception of HB) to finding a negotiated 
solution to ending political violence. This approach enabled the PNV to be 
seen to lead the fight against terrorism in a context where electoral support 
for ETA’s political fronts was declining; and it served to fend off rival parties’ 
criticism of the PNV for sharing ETA’s ultimate secessionist goal. 
Secondly, strategic stability was also arguably a product of the PNV’s dis-
tinctive internal organisational structures, which were crucial in managing 
the enduring ideological duality within the party between secessionist and 
autonomist positions. This duality had been reproduced over time through 
a network of cultural, educational, media, sporting and social organisations 
indirectly linked to the PNV and which resulted in strong loyalty to the par-
ty.63 That the PNV’s moderate territorial strategy in Basque government was 
not challenged by more radical sectors can be attributed to the long-standing 
and strict division of power between public and party office holders within 
the party.64 Whilst the PNV in regional government focused on implement-
ing Basque autonomy, leaders of the voluntary party were freer to talk of 
longer term aspirations for Basque sovereignty. This organisational model 
thus enabled the PNV to respond to, and satisfy, the competing territorial 
preferences of its membership.  
From the Mid-1990s to 2016: Between Territorial 
Accommodation and Secession
From the mid-1990s onwards, the territorial goals and strategies of both the 
PNV and CiU shifted. By 2003, the PNV was advocating the “free associa-
tion” of the Basque Country with Spain.65 What became known as the “Plan 
63. Pablo, and Mees, Péndulo patriótico, 136-140.
64. Pérez Nievas, “Partido Nacionalista Vasco”, 112.
65. Gobierno Vasco, Propuesta de Estatuto.
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Ibarretxe”, after the PNV leader of the regional government, Juan José Ibar-
retxe, was conceived as a “’third way’ proposal stopping short of secession and 
retaining the Spanish state framework for a number of crucial issues”.66 By 
the end of the decade, however, the PNV had shifted back to a more moderate 
position that insisted on the need to negotiate the implementation and up-
dating of the 1979 Basque Statute of Autonomy.67 At the same time, the par-
ty shifted its focus onto economic issues; self-government, when discussed, 
was propounded as the most effective tool in the fight against the recession 
and the protection of the welfare state.68  In CiU’s case, historic support for 
territorial accommodation gave way to increasingly radical territorial goals: 
reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 200369, a demand for “fiscal 
sovereignty” along the lines of the Basque concierto económico70 by the end of 
that decade71, and by 2012 a commitment to creating “our own state”.72 Sub-
sequent efforts to establish a separate Catalan state—an endeavour that led to 
alignments with other pro-independence parties from 2012 onwards—fuelled 
internal divisions over CiU’s ultimate goal and how it should achieve it, cul-
minating in the organisation’s definitive break-up in June 2015. Subsequently, 
whilst CDC73 has committed itself to pushing forward with the process of 
separating Catalonia from Spain, UDC’s leadership has defended the more 
ambiguous goal of full sovereignty to be achieved through negotiation and 
compromise with the Spanish state.74 
The evolution of the “state of autonomies” model provided the broader struc-
tural context within which both parties began to re-think their territorial 
ambitions. As argued above, CiU and PNV had been generally effective until 
the mid-1990s in negotiating bilaterally with the state in order to implement 
and expand regional autonomy provisions. However, these parties were also 
66. Keating, and Bray, Renegotiating Sovereignty, 354.
67. Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Compromiso Euskadi, 255-261.
68. Ibid.
69. CiU, Tu ets primer, 101.  
70. The concierto económico is a legal instrument that regulates the financial relations between 
the Spanish state and the Basque territories. Established in 1878, it provides the Basque re-
gional government with a high-degree of tax autonomy. 
71. CiU, Eleccions nacionals, 82.
72. CiU, Programa electoral 2012, 15.
73. In July 2016, CDC was refounded as the Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català. 
74. La Vanguardia, “CDC I UDC”.
144 REAF núm. 25, abril 2017, p. 129-165 
Anwen Elias, Ludger Mees
frustrated by state-wide parties’ efforts to modify the distribution of power 
between the state and the autonomous communities. For example, periodic 
pacts between the PSOE and PP introduced greater symmetry into Spain’s 
territorial model by the mid-1990s, and removed any distinction between 
Spain’s ‘historic nationalities’ (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) 
and other autonomous communities.75 This prompted co-ordinated action 
between CiU, the PNV and the Galician Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) 
to demand a new territorial model that ensured legal and political recogni-
tion of the “national realities of the Spanish state”.76 More recently, and in 
response to the perception that the PP-led central government was re-cen-
tralizing a range of regional competencies under the guise of managing the 
effects of the 2008 financial crisis77, the CiU and the PNV announced their 
shared desire for “another state model”.78 On both occasions, however, these 
declarations were little more than symbolic gestures. Shared frustration with 
new developments in the operation of Spain’s territorial model did not lead 
to any convergence between, or co-operation to achieve, these parties’ ter-
ritorial ambitions. Instead, other factors led the PNV and CiU to shift their 
territorial goals in different directions, and these reflected the different po-
litical and economic contexts within which the parties operated from the 
mid-1990s onwards.
In the PNV’s case, territorial radicalisation was first and foremost a strategic 
response to changes in the Basque political context in this period. The failure 
of previous efforts to bring an end to political violence, an increase in the 
frequency and scope of ETA’s armed struggle during the 1990s, and grow-
ing popular support for a  tougher anti-terrorist policy, placed pressure on 
the PNV to pursue a different strategy vis-à-vis radical Basque nationalism. 
The party thus began negotiations with the paramilitaries, resulting in the 
creation of a new nationalist alliance to advance the struggle for Basque 
self-government. The result was the Pacto de Lizarra with other nationalist 
and left-wing organisations (including HB) in 1998 which called for polit-
ical negotiations to achieve the unity and sovereignty of the Spanish and 
75. Aja, Estado autonómico, 56-61.
76. Declaration of Barcelona 1998, quoted in Guibernau, “Spain”, 63.
77. See Muro, “When do countries recentralize?”.
78. La Vanguardia, “PNV y CiU”.
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French Basque territories, and a ceasefire by ETA.79 The PNV’s new alliance 
with radical nationalists led the Basque Socialists to withdraw from regional 
government in 1998, and after new elections, the PNV secured the legislative 
support of Euskal Herritarrok (EH), a party close to ETA, for its minority 
government. This collaboration proved short-lived however: ETA broke the 
ceasefire in November 1999 and new elections took place in 2001. On this 
occasion, the PNV (in coalition with EA) won its highest ever level of sup-
port in Basque elections—42.7% of the vote—with new support from those 
opposed to ETA’s actions and from others who objected to the aggressive 
criticism of the PNV by state-wide parties and the Spanish media for hav-
ing negotiated with terrorists.80 The PNV (in regional government this time 
with EA and Ezker Batua (EB), the Basque branch of the state-wide Izquierda 
Unida) launched the Ibarretxe Plan in the context of these shifting political 
alliances in the Basque Country.  
However, Ibarretxe’s sovereigntist discourse led to a deep crisis within the 
PNV, with moderate sectors opposed to the radicalisation of territorial goals 
and political alliances. In particular, critics perceived his strategy to have 
violated the historic balance of power within the party by marginalising 
the leadership of the voluntary party and leaving little scope for reconcil-
ing competing territorial preferences within the PNV. Ibarretxe’s territorial 
radicalisation is also widely held to have lost the PNV votes (from 42.7% of 
votes cast in 2001 to 38.7%) and four seats in the 2005 Basque elections.81 
The more recent shift away from this territorial position has been driven by 
more moderate leaders of the PNV party organisation committed to restoring 
the internal balance of power between the voluntary party and the PNV in 
public office. Their efforts were facilitated by the defeat of the Plan Ibar-
retxe in the Spanish parliament in February 2005, and the party’s exit from 
Basque government in 2009 as a result of its failure to form a new coalition 
government. These developments happened in a context of limited popular 
support for Basque independence—which at the peak of the PNV’s electoral 
success in 2001 remained static at 21%—and at a time when unemployment 
79. Mees, Nationalism, Violence, 101-142.
80. Mees, “Nationalist politics”.
81. For example, the day after the election an editorial in the Spanish newspaper El País 
argued that “now Ibarretxe knows that radicalization loses you votes” (El País, “Los vascos”). 
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and terrorism were the most important issues in voters’ eyes.82  The Plan 
Ibarretxe, therefore, was an elite-driven project that (unlike in CiU’s case—
see below) did not respond to strong grass-roots mobilisation in support of 
radical constitutional change. 
The PNV’s exit from regional government reinforced internal support for 
a more moderate territorial discourse, as part of a strategy to re-establish 
its dominance of the political centre ground in Basque politics. At the same 
time, a shift of focus onto economic issues was also caused by a deteriorating 
economic context. The structure of the Basque economy and the higher level 
of fiscal resources derived from the operation of the concierto económico meant 
that the financial crisis was less severe than in other parts of Spain (such as 
Catalonia—see below).83 Nevertheless, unemployment increased from 5.8% 
in 2008 to 16.6% in 2012, whilst GDP per capita fell from € 31,243 in 2008 
to € 29,233.84 The PNV’s re-focused territorial strategy contributed to the 
party PNV re-entering regional government in 201285, a position it strength-
ened and extended in local and regional elections in 2015 and 2016.86  This 
period of electoral ascendancy provides little incentive to shift away from a 
territorial goal that (as in earlier years) is deliberately ambiguous, with the 
possible options including further autonomy, a federal or confederal state, 
or a bilateral relation with the state through an updating of the “historical 
rights” granted by the Spanish Constitution.87 
The decline of ETA, which ended its armed struggle in 2011, facilitated the 
PNV’s strategic re-framing of its territorial politics. It has also paved the way 
for entry into party competition of new parties and coalitions with previous 
links to ETA, and their secessionist demands have increased as their Cata-
lan counterparts have sought to move forward with the process of Catalan 
82. Sociómetro Vasco 17, 58, 65.
83. BBVA, Situación; Zubiri, “Análisis del sistema foral”.
84. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, “CRE. PIB per cápita”.
85. Gómez, and Cabeza, “Basque Regional Elections 2012”.
86. In 2015 the PNV secured governing majorities (with legislative support from the PSE-EE) 
in provincial governments, as well as the capital cities, of all three Basque provinces and of 
the regional government of Navarra. In the elections to the Basque Parliament in September 
2016, the party increased its vote share from 34.61% in 2012 to 37.66%, and its number of 
seats from 27 to 29.
87. Mees, “Nationalist politics”, 55.
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independence (see below). However, the Ibarretxe experience demonstrated 
that there was little support in the Basque Country for such radical consti-
tutional options, and this has not changed in subsequent years. Support for 
independence rose to 30% in 2014, but dropped back to 23% in 2016.88 More-
over, recent political discussion around the need to reform the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution has led some state-wide parties to argue for the elimination of 
key references to the historical foundations of Basque self-government (such 
as the ‘historical rights’ of the Basque nation and the concierto económico).89 
The risk of losing these key territorial provisions is a further incentive for the 
PNV to desist from pushing for full Basque sovereignty. These considerations 
have led the party to distance itself repeatedly from the secessionist process 
in Catalonia.90
In CiU’s case, the shift in territorial goals—from territorial accommodation 
to asserting Catalan sovereignty—must be understood in the context of the 
party’s declining electoral performance since the mid-1990s. This was a con-
sequence of allegations of corruption in public office, internal tensions over 
Pujol’s succession as party leader, and unpopular legislative alliances with 
the PP in the Spanish and Catalan parliaments in the late 1990s and early 
2000s.91 The latter in particular saw CiU agree not to propose the reform of 
Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy, in spite of the party’s frustration with the 
implementation of these provisions (see above). Crucially, this was at a time of 
important shifts in public opinion on Catalonia’s governance arrangements: 
between 1992 and 2003, support for Catalonia to have more autonomy within 
a federal Spanish state increased from 17.1% to 27.2% (although support for 
Catalan independence remained steady at 18.4%).92 
In contrast, rival parties in the Catalan political space sought to re-position 
themselves strategically to push for the further empowerment of the Catalan 
88. Sociómetro Vasco, Sociómetro Vasco 61.
89.  For example, the new party Ciudadanos has demanded the elimination of the Basque 
concierto económico (Ciudadanos, Nuevo proyecto), whilst the PP’s President of the Autonomous 
Community of Madrid, Cristina Cifuentes, publically rejected the concierto as “discrimina-
tory, unequal and unjust” (El Correo, “Presidenta de Madrid”). 
90. See for example Iñigo Urkullu, President of the Basque Government, quoted in El País, 
“Urkullo se aleja”.  
91. Barrio, and Barberà, “Convergència”; Elias, “Catalan Independence”.
92. ICPS, Sondeig 1992 and Sondeig 2003.
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regional institutions. On the one hand, with the PSOE out of central govern-
ment since 1996, the PSC re-branded itself as a Catalanist party committed 
to increasing Catalan self-government;93 on the other hand, ERC adopted 
a pragmatic strategy that accepted gradual increases in self-government as 
a step towards the ultimate goal of Catalan independence.94 By the early 
2000s, these two parties had found common ground on the issue of reform-
ing Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy and this—along with the prospect of 
a progressive left-wing alternative to CiU in regional government—created 
sufficient electoral support to allow the PSC and ERC (along with Iniciativa 
per Catalunya Verds) to enter Catalan government in 2003. CiU’s initial 
shift to support reform of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 2003 was thus 
largely a reactive strategic response to other parties’ demands for enhanced 
autonomy in a broader context in which frustration with Catalonia’s existing 
autonomy settlement was growing.
From a position of opposition in the Catalan parliament between 2003 and 
2010, CiU’s priority was to regain electoral support and public office.95 Fur-
ther territorial radicalisation from this point onwards can be attributed in 
part to a process of organisational renewal led by CDC; it brought a new 
generation of pro-sovereignty activists into the party who were dissatisfied 
with CiU’s historical strategy of advancing Catalan autonomy incrementally 
through bilateral negotiations with the central state.96 This view became 
more widespread within CDC (as well as sections of UDC) from 2010 on-
wards, when the Spanish Constitutional Court annulled large parts of the 
revised Catalan Statute of Autonomy that had been approved by referendum 
in June 2006. The decision prompted large-scale and sustained mass mobi-
lisation in favour of Catalan independence,97 underpinned by broader shifts 
in public opinion on how Catalonia should be governed: in contrast to the 
stability of support for independence in the Basque case, in Catalonia this 
grew from 13.6% in June 2005, to 25.2% in November 2010.98
93. Vallès, Agenda imperfecta.
94. Culla, Esquerra.
95. Elias, “Catalan Independence”.
96. Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia”.
97. Crameri, “Political power”.
98. Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, Suport a la independència.
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CiU’s shift to demand fiscal sovereignty for Catalonia was thus a response 
to internal and external pressures for a more radical conceptualisation of 
Catalonia’s relationship with Spain. It was also a response to the effects of 
the financial crisis. One of the worst fiscal deficits of all Spain’s autonomous 
communities99 and rising unemployment (from 7.5% in 2008 to 23.8% in 
2012) brought into focus Catalonia’s position as a net contributor to Spain’s 
common financing regime which re-distributes wealth from richer to poorer 
regions.100 CiU blamed unpopular cuts to welfare policies on central gov-
ernment austerity policies, and argued that greater fiscal autonomy was the 
only way of providing Catalonia with the financial resources necessary to 
achieve economic recovery.101 However, the PP in central government blocked 
attempts to negotiate a further increase in fiscal competencies, as well as 
CiU’s subsequent efforts to hold a referendum on Catalan independence. Such 
opposition fuelled growing support for Catalan independence, which reached 
a peak of 48.9% in 2014,102 and provided the context for a further shift in po-
sition, to assert the Catalan people’s “right to decide” on their political future. 
Such a shift, however, undermined CiU’s long-standing reputation as a mod-
erate political party committed to the territorial accommodation of Catalan 
distinctiveness within Spain.103 This, the superior independentist credibility 
of other parties (especially ERC) and CiU’s controversial austerity policies, 
contributed to electoral losses in 2012.104  Internal differences over how to 
respond to this electoral decline ultimately led to the break-up of CiU in June 
2015. It paved the way for CDC and UDC to pursue very different strategies 
in the 2015 Catalan elections: the former as part of a new pro-independence 
alliance—Junts pel Sí (JpS)—that presented the elections as a de-facto referen-
dum on Catalonia’s future within Spain, and the latter as a party laying claim 
to CiU’s historic territorial commitment to moderation and negotiation. In 
spite of on-going corruption investigations involving CDC and its long-time 
leader Jordi Pujol, JpS emerged as the largest party with 39.6% of the vote 
and, with other pro-independence parties, claimed a majority in the Catalan 
parliament which provided the basis for a declared intent to start a ‘process 
99. La Vanguardia, “Ranking”.
100. Castells, “Catalonia and Spain”; Gray, Nationalist Politics, 108-109.
101. For example, Mas, “Discurs del president”.
102. Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, Baròmetre.
103. Elias, “Catalan Independence”, 96.
104. Rico, and Liñeira, “Bringing”.
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of disconnection’ from the Spanish state;105 in contrast, UDC’s 2.5% saw it 
fail to secure any parliamentary representation.
Explaining the Shifting Territorial Goals of the PNV 
and CiU
The case studies show that, whilst the PNV and CiU have at times been sym-
bolic allies in opposing the Spanish state, their territorial goals have varied 
both over time and from party to party. CiU has shifted from an accommo-
dationist stance to a more pro-sovereigntist (for UDC) and pro-secessionist 
(for CDC) one, whilst the PNV has moved back and forth between these 
positions. This section considers the extent to which the hypotheses presented 
above can explain these changes.
Party ideology
Whilst both the PNV and CiU have sought to function as ‘broad churches’ 
capable of accommodating a diversity of views within their organisations, 
the case studies confirm the role of party ideology as a fundamental and en-
during constraint on these parties’ positioning on territorial issues. For the 
former, this is apparent in the long-standing ideological duality (with support 
for secession as well as territorial accommodation) within the party. These 
values have underpinned a tendency to conceptualise territorial goals in a 
sufficiently ambiguous way to accommodate competing views. When this 
strategy was abandoned in the 2000s in favour of a more explicit assertion 
of Basque sovereignty, it caused the disillusionment of moderate activists and 
voters who had hitherto been comfortable with the PNV’s catch-all territorial 
project. The PNV’s ideological heritage thus provided a strong constraint on 
its efforts at territorial re-positioning, with the shift back to a more moderate 
accommodationist position reaping substantial electoral rewards. 
In CiU’s case, the constraining role of ideology is also in evidence. The par-
ty’s Catalanist profile during the 1980s and 1990s was built on the basis of 
an unambiguous and principled commitment to Catalan autonomy through 
105. Martí, and Cetrà, “2015 Catalan election”.
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negotiation with the central state. Whilst a combination of external and in-
ternal pressures pushed the party towards a more radical position from the 
mid-2000s onwards, such a stance did not fit with the party’s more moderate 
reputation on territorial issues. For example, CDC’s increasingly pro-inde-
pendence position alienated traditional and more moderate CiU voters, and 
led to ultimately fatal tensions with UDC within the CiU party federation. 
At the same time, CDC also struggled to convince pro-independence voters 
of the sincerity of its new sovereigntist ambitions, especially when faced 
with rival nationalist parties with a longer ideological commitment to, and 
therefore stronger credibility on, Catalan independence. These examples re-
flect the tensions often faced by political parties between their core identity 
and values, built up gradually over time, and pressures to adapt to a changed 
political context. 
Impact of the financial crisis
The Basque Country and Catalonia have always been wealthier regions rel-
ative to Spain as a whole. On the basis of this common position vis-à-vis the 
centre, from the hypothesis formulated above one would expect a similar 
response to the financial crisis characterised by a demand for new compe-
tencies in economic management. However, whilst both the PNV and CiU 
denounced the central government’s centralizing policy response to the fi-
nancial crisis, only the latter took the further step of demanding greater 
self-government in the form of fiscal sovereignty. In part, this divergence 
between the two cases reflects the different way in which the financial crisis 
affected both territories, as a result of the specific structure of the economy in 
the two places. However, nationalist party responses to these effects were also 
mediated by the different financing regimes within which the autonomous 
communities operate, as specified in the Spanish Constitution. Whereas in 
the rest of Spain’s autonomous communities all taxes are collected by the 
Spanish government, in Navarre and the Basque Country the provinces are 
responsible for this; these provinces contribute to the Spanish budget by 
transferring a fixed amount of money as payment for the services provided 
by the Spanish state in these territories.106 This asymmetry in regional financ-
106. For a detailed comparison of the two financial regimes, see Gray, Nationalist Politics, 
97-112.
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ing provisions dictated the institutional and financial resources available to 
the PNV and CiU regional governments in responding to the effects of the 
financial crisis, leading to new demands for self-government in the Catalan 
case but not in the Basque one. 
Territorial structure of the state
The discussion above provides the first confirmation of the way in which 
the territorial organisation of the Spanish state shapes the opportunity 
structures available to nationalist parties in pursuit of their territorial 
goals. Divergent competencies in regional financing served to differenti-
ate party responses to the financial crisis. The Spanish Constitution also 
differentiates between the Basque Country and Catalonia in a further re-
spect: whilst the “historical rights” (including the concierto económico) of 
the former are recognised, no such recognition is extended to Catalonia. 
In practice, however, the implementation of the basic principles of decen-
tralisation set out in the Constitution have provided a common legal and 
institutional framework within which the PNV and CiU conceptualised 
and pursued their territorial goals.107 Specifically, the ambiguity of the ‘state 
of autonomies’ model incentivised both parties to focus on implementing 
and expanding self-government during the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, 
since the mid-1990s, and in response to the dynamics of standardisation 
and re-centralisation that were perceived to undermine Basque and Catalan 
autonomy, both parties sought to advance a common (albeit vague) agenda 
of territorial re-structuring. 
However, the fact that the PNV and CiU responded very differently to these 
common challenges, indicates that within this broad constitutional frame-
work, other factors were more important determinants of their territorial 
positions. As hypothesised above, many of these relate to the political context 
within which the parties operated. However, as expected, decentralisation 
has also transformed the way in which these dynamics play out, at the same 
time as creating new opportunities and constraints on SNRPs in pursuit of 
their territorial goals. The different ways in which this has happened are 
considered below. 
107. Herrero de Miñón, Derechos históricos.
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Dynamics of party competition
In line with other work that has examined the territorial strategies of 
SNRPs, the case studies confirm the strong influence of party competition 
on the territorial goals of the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties ex-
amined here. As expected, the interaction with two types of political actor 
are shown to be crucial, namely state-wide parties (and their branches in 
the regional political space) and other nationalist parties. However, the 
exact manifestation of these dynamics has varied over time and among the 
different cases, as a consequence of the specific conditions in which party 
competition takes place. 
Firstly, state-wide parties have taken different stances on territorial issues 
in both places, with different consequences for parties’ territorial positions. 
In Catalonia, from the 1990s onwards the PSC successfully challenged CiU’s 
dominance of the regional political space by enhancing its own territo-
rial profile. This strategy contributed to CiU’s electoral decline from the 
late 1990s onwards, precipitating a process of territorial re-positioning in 
subsequent years. In contrast, since the early 2000s, the PP’s increasingly 
anti-Catalanist discourse and refusal to countenance new concessions on 
self-government fuelled CiU’s radicalisation. In the Basque Country, the 
PNV has been less vulnerable to the efforts of state-wide parties to encroach 
on its electorate due to the strong loyalty of its support base, a product of 
the organizational networks indirectly linked to it. State-wide parties also 
collaborated to reject the legislative advance of the Plan Ibarretxe in the 
mid-2000s. Electoral competition also focused much more on the issue of 
terrorism, and strong attacks on the PNV’s failure to bring an end to ETA 
activism was a key driver of Ibarretxe’s post-sovereigntist strategy during 
the 2000s. With the demise of ETA in 2011, this dimension of party com-
petition has disappeared and has facilitated the PNV’s territorial re-orien-
tation in recent years. 
At different times and to different extents, other SNRPs have also been effec-
tive in putting pressure on the PNV and CiU to shift their territorial goals. In 
the latter case, this was weak until the mid-1990s, but the strategic re-orien-
tation of ERC from the mid-1990s and the emergence of other pro-independ-
ence parties more recently, generated new pressures on CiU to shift towards a 
more sovereigntist position. Its recent legislative alliances (ERC and CiU from 
2012-15) and electoral alliances (JpS) represent a shift in party strategy in an 
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attempt to steer and advance the on-going debate on Catalonia’s relationship 
with the rest of Spain. In contrast, in the Basque case intra-nationalist com-
petition originated from splits from the PNV (to create ETA in the late 1950s, 
and EA in 1986). As argued above, the latter prompted the PNV to form a new 
coalition alliance that had the effect of consolidating its moderate territorial 
politics. However, it is the former—and the persistence of political violence 
in the Basque Country until 2011—that has constituted the most important 
influence on the PNV’s goals and is thus the principal difference between 
the two cases considered here. For much of the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
PNV sought to distance itself from ETA’s armed violence; this was shown in 
the focus on implementing Basque autonomy and the cross-party initiatives 
condemning political violence. The PNV’s radicalisation from the mid-1990s 
reflected a new strategy of cooperation with ETA in order to create a new 
pan-nationalist political consensus on Basque self-government. ETA’s ceasefire 
in 2011 fundamentally altered the Basque political context within which the 
PNV now operates and has facilitated the shift of focus away from radical 
territorial re-structuring, and onto the business of managing socio-economic 
responses to the economic crisis. 
Public opinion on constitutional change
As well as responding to the strategic behaviour of other parties in the 
political space, the case studies confirm the hypothesis that SNRPs will also 
take into consideration what voters think about different constitutional 
options. The constitutional preferences of the electorate are found to dic-
tate the extent to which a nationalist party’s territorial goal has traction 
beyond its core support base. In the Basque case, the relative stability of 
support for independence since the 1990s (usually between 20 and 25%) 
limited the popular appeal of the Plan Ibarretxe—even though the Plan’s 
goal was not the foundation of an independent state—whilst the PNV’s 
current territorial position is far more in tune with the Basque electorate’s 
long-standing preference for strong autonomy within the Spanish state. In 
the Catalan case, constitutional preferences have taken a different trajecto-
ry with very different implications for CiU. Increasing support for reform 
of the status quo since the 1990s, and more recently a spectacular increase 
in support for Catalan independence, has incentivised the party to shift its 
own territorial position in order to retain electoral credibility as the party 
of Catalan self-government. 
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However, the case studies also suggest a second way in which public opinion 
may shape SNRPs’ territorial preferences, since the relative importance of 
the issue of constitutional change to voters at a given point in time is also 
shown to matter. It is only in Catalonia in recent years that constitutional 
change has become a priority issue for voters, and its salience was one factor 
that contributed to CiU’s radicalisation of its territorial demands in recent 
years. Otherwise, issues relating to economic performance and, in the Basque 
Country, terrorism, have consistently been more salient; the PNV’s current 
strategy has responded to this by de-emphasising constitutional change and 
focusing on the day-to-day issues that matter more to voters. The analysis 
thus suggests that public opinion may shape not only how, but also how 
much, nationalist parties can talk about their territorial goals.
The impact of being in vs. out of government
Both the PNV and CiU have always conceived of themselves as office-seek-
ing parties, committed to using the opportunities and resources of govern-
ment office to advance their territorial agendas.108 As for SNRPs in many 
other places, dynamics of multi-level voting bolstered these parties’ elector-
al, and consequently political, status in the Basque Country and Catalonia 
respectively; this contributed to the PNV and CiU being parties of regional 
government for most of the post-Franco period. The empirical analysis of 
these cases therefore does not allow a test of the hypothesis that parties 
that choose to stay out of government will adopt more radical territorial 
positions.
However, it does provide partial confirmation of the expectation that aspir-
ing to, and occupying, government office, will exert a moderating pressure 
on SNRPs’ territorial goals. For example, the strategy of negotiating strong 
autonomy with the state during the transition to democracy enabled both 
parties to secure enough electoral support to enter regional government in 
1980. In the subsequent two decades, both parties also used the resources 
and opportunities of being in government to build up their credibility as 
moderate territorial parties able to implement and expand political auton-
omy. In the PNV’s case, its coalition alliance with the PSE-EE between 1987 
108. Barrio, and Barberà, “Convergència”; Pérez Nievas, “Partido Nacionalista Vasco”.
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and 1998 consolidated this profile. And yet, the case studies show that being 
in government is no guarantee that SNRPs will pursue moderate territorial 
strategies in government: both the Plan Ibarretxe in the mid-2000s, and 
CiU’s radicalisation more recently, were undertaken from such a governing 
position. As these two examples suggest, other pressures may prove stronger 
than the moderating effects of public office, with the effect that SNRPs are 
pulled in a different direction on territorial issues. 
Dynamics of multi-level politics
Like many other SNRPs, the PNV and CiU have always operated in regional 
and state-wide political arenas simultaneously. As hypothesised above, the 
multi-level nature of these parties’ operating environment has provided both 
opportunities and constraints in terms of their territorial ambitions. On 
the one hand, PNV/CiU support for minority PSOE, and then PP, central 
governments (from 1993-1996 and 1996-2000 respectively) served to expand 
the scope of decentralisation and bolstered the credibility of the national-
ist parties as moderate parties capable of delivering more self-government. 
On the other hand, the case studies also flag up the potential risks of such 
vertical linkages. For example, CiU’s decision to collaborate with the PP—a 
party ideologically opposed to accelerated de-centralisation—constrained its 
ability to take the initiative on statute reform, and allowed rivals to success-
fully challenge its Catalanist credibility. Dynamics of multi-level politics, like 
other factors within SNRPs’ operating environment, thus have the potential 
to push parties towards a territorial position that is at odds with core ide-
ological values. As the next section argues, how these tensions are resolved 
boils down to the balance of power between different strategic preferences 
within SNRPs. 
Party Organisation
Finally, the case studies highlight the role of internal organisational dynam-
ics in conditioning the territorial strategies of the PNV and CiU, although 
these are party-specific and reflect the distinct origins and evolution of each 
organisation. Factionalism has been a constant within the PNV since its ear-
liest years, although the party’s highly de-centralised organisational model 
structured around a broad network of social organisations has provided a 
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means of accommodating these divisions and mitigating their potentially 
destabilising effects. In the time period considered here, rivalry between 
pro-sovereigntist and accommodationist sectors was one of the factors that 
resulted in the split of EA in 1986, and incentivised the PNV to consolidate its 
moderate territorial strategy in the face of new competition from a pro-sover-
eigntist rival. Similar tensions resurfaced during Juan José Ibarretxe’s time as 
president of the Basque government in 1999-2009, but were better managed, 
particularly as a consequence of the memory of the difficult split of 1986.109 
A crucial factor here was the long-standing organisational balance of power 
between different ‘faces’ of the PNV party organisation: moderate leaders of 
the voluntary party acted to mitigate Ibarretxe’s radical territorial strategy, 
shifting the party back to its long-standing ambiguous territorial position 
which successfully reconciles competing ideological positions. That they were 
able to do so can be explained by the PNV’s loss of electoral support during 
this period, its inability to forge new alliances and governing majorities, and 
the weakness of nationalist rivals who might otherwise have criticised the 
PNV’s change of heart. The empirical evidence thus points to the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the internal life and external environment 
of political parties. 
This interplay is also evident in CiU’s case, although with a different out-
come. In spite of its origins as an electoral alliance between two inde-
pendent political parties, until the 2000s CiU displayed a higher degree of 
internal cohesion than the PNV. This was due to the strong leadership of 
CDC and UDC within the alliance, and elite-managed relations between 
them. CiU’s electoral hegemony during the 1980s and 1990s was also cru-
cial in sustaining this internal cohesion. In contrast, tensions between and 
within CDC and UDC accelerated once the question of sovereignty was 
raised in Catalan political debates from the 2000s onwards, and were ex-
acerbated by generational change within the party and the refusal of the 
Spanish state to engage in bilateral negotiations from 2011 onwards. Efforts 
at managing these internal tensions ultimately failed: the irreconcilability 
of different visions of how to respond to CiU’s changed context led to its 
collapse in 2015. 
109. Mees, “Nationalist politics”.
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Conclusion
As noted in the Introduction, territorial relations in Spain have come un-
der increasing pressure in recent years as a result of renewed national-
ist mobilisation. Understanding how and why nationalist parties seek to 
challenge the constitutional stability and integrity of the Spanish state 
is a prerequisite for any future process of territorial reform. This article 
advances such an understanding by mapping and explaining the evolution 
of the territorial goals and strategies of two of the principal actors—the 
PNV and CiU—shaping centre-periphery dynamics. Our analysis high-
lights the way in which a common set of contextual and intra-party factors 
interact differently in the two cases, leading parties committed to the same 
fundamental goal (increasing self-government) and often facing common 
challenges (evolution of decentralisation, the financial crisis), to pursue 
very different territorial goals. We have not considered here the extent to 
which nationalist parties’ shifting territorial goals are also underpinned 
by more fundamental changes in cultural and linguistic factors; this is an 
important avenue for future research given the importance of these dimen-
sions to nationalist mobilisation in both places, and would complement the 
analysis presented here. Our findings are nevertheless significant because of 
the new insights they provide into the evolution of nationalist grievances 
in the Basque Country and Catalonia. 
The findings also contribute to the broader literature on SNRPs in two ways. 
Firstly, this work provides a useful framework for understanding the ways 
in which SNRPs must try to reconcile long-standing territorial values, with 
shorter-term pressures emanating from the context within which they op-
erate and which become stronger as parties become increasingly important 
players in regional party systems. Applying this framework to new cases, 
such as the PNV and CiU, is valuable in highlighting how a common set of 
factors can play out in specific ways in different places at different times. At 
the same time, however, the analysis serves to further refine this framework, 
by pointing to the role of internal power relations within parties in shaping 
SNRPs’ responses to competing pressures on their territorial positioning. This 
factor has been largely overlooked to date, and future work should focus on 
undertaking a more systematic analysis of the extent to which it influences 
SNRPs to adopt a particular territorial stance. Secondly, we offer one of the 
first analyses of how the financial crisis has influenced SNRPs’ territorial 
projects. Our findings suggest that party responses will be mediated by the 
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ideological, political and constitutional constraints within which SNRPs 
operate; future work should explore the extent to which such an argument 
holds in other cases. 
References 
Aja, Eliseo. Estado autonómico y reforma federal. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 
2014.
Alonso, Sonia. Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Cred-
ibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Barberà, Oscar. Alianzas políticas, relaciones de poder y cambio organizativo. El 
caso de Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (1978-2003). Madrid: CIS, 2011.
Barrio, Astrid. “Organización y papel político del nacionalismo moderado 
catalán durante la Transición”. In: Rafael Quirosa-Cheurouze (ed.). Los 
partidos en la Transición. Las organizaciones políticas en la construcción de 
la democracia española. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2013: 307-321.
 , and Oscar Barberà. “Convergència i Unió”. In: Anwen Elias, and F. 
Tronconi (eds). From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the Chal-
lenges of Representation. Vienna: Braumüller, 2011: 75-98.
Bartolini, Stefano. “Electoral and party competition: Analytical dimensions 
and empirical problems”. In: Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, 
and Juan José Linz (eds.). Political Parties: Old Concepts, New Challenges. 
Oxford: OUP, 2002: 84-112.
BBVA. Situación País Vasco. 2011. Available at: https://www.bbvaresearch.
com/wp-content/uploads/migrados/Situacion_Pvasco_1S11_castel-
lano_tcm346-261452.pdf (accessed 21 February 2017).
Budge, Ian. “Theory and measurement of party policy positions”. In: I. Budge, 
H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, and E. Tanenbaum (eds.). Map-
ping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 
1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 75-90.
Castells, Antoni. “Catalonia and Spain at the Crossroads: Financial and Eco-
nomic Aspects”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 30, no. 2 (2014): 277-
296. 
Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió. El suport a la independència de Catalunya. Anàlisi de 
canvis i tendències en el període 2005-2012. Barcelona: Centre d’Estudis 
d’Opinió, 2012. 
 . Baròmetre d’Opinió Política - 2a onada 2015. 2015. Available at: http://
ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages (accessed 16 November 2015). 
160 REAF núm. 25, abril 2017, p. 129-165 
Anwen Elias, Ludger Mees
CiU. Tu ets Primer. Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya 2003. Barcelona: CiU, 
2003. 
 . Eleccions Nacionals 2010. Programa de Govern, Projecte de Pais. Barce-
lona: CiU, 2010.
 . Programa Electoral 2012. Catalunya 2020. 2012. Available at: http://php.
inefc.net/observatori/fitxers_pujats_GECOS/2012_parlament_CIU.pdf.
Ciudadanos. El nuevo proyecto común para España. 2015. Available at: https://
www.ciudadanos-cs.org/programa-electoral (accessed 13 December 
2015). 
Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to 
Nationalist Mobilization. London: Hurst, 1997.
Crameri, Kathryn. “Political power and civil counterpower: The complex 
dynamics of the Catalan independence movement”. Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics 21, no.1 (2015): 104-120.
Culla, Joan B. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 1931-2012. Barcelona: La 
Campana, 2013.
De Winter, Lieven. “Conclusion. A comparative analysis of the electoral, of-
fice and policy success of ethnoregionalist parties”. In: L. De Winter, 
and H. Tursan (eds.). Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. London: Rou-
tledge, 1998: 204-247.
Detterbeck, Klaus. Multi-level Party Politics in Western Europe. London: Pal-
grave, 2012. 
Díez Medrano, Juan. Divided Nations: Class, Politics and Nationalism in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.
El Correo. “La presidenta de Madrid dice que el Concierto vasco es una ‘dis-
criminación’ a otras comunidades”. 18 April 2015. Available at: http://el-
pais.com/diario/2005/04/18/opinion/1113775201_850215.html (accessed 
1 March 2017). 
El País. “Urkullu se aleja de la vía soberanista de Cataluña ante la presión 
‘abertzale’”. 4 November 2015. Available at: http://ccaa.elpais.com/
ccaa/2015/03/31/paisvasco/1427826639_993323.html (accessed 1 March 
2017). 
 . “Los vascos se cuentan a sí mismos”. 18 April 2005. Available at: http://
elpais.com/diario/2005/04/18/opinion/1113775201_850215.html (ac-
cessed 1 March 2017). 
 . “Arzalluz reivindica la soberanía de los territorios vascos en España y 
Francia”. 1 August 1995. Available at: http://elpais.com/diario/1995/08/01/
espana/807228017_850215.html (accessed 28 February 2017). 
161 REAF núm. 25, abril 2017, p. 129-165
Between accommodation and secession: Explaining the shifting territorial goals of nationalist 
parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia
Elias, Anwen. “Catalan Independence and the Challenge of Credibility: The 
Causes and Consequences of Catalan Nationalist Parties’ Strategic Be-
havior”. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 21, no. 1 (2015): 83-103. 
 . Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative 
Study. London: Routledge, 2009.
 . “From marginality to opposition to government: Mapping the ideo-
logical evolution of Plaid Cymru and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego”. 
Regional and Federal Studies 19, no. 4/5 (2009): 533-558.
 , Edina Szöcsik, and Christina Zuber. “Position, Selective Emphasis and 
Framing: How parties deal with a second dimension in competition”. 
Party Politics 21, no. 6 (2015): 839-850. 
 , and Filippo Tronconi. “From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties in 
Government”. Party Politics 17, no. 4 (2011): 505-524.
 , (eds.). From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the Challenges of 
Representation. Vienna: Braumüller, 2011.
Elorza, Antonio, Gurutz Jáuregui, and José María Garmendia. La historia de 
ETA. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2006. 
European Commission. Economic Crisis in Europe. Causes, Consequences and 
Responses. 2009. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
publications/pages/publication15887_en.pdf (accessed 13 January 2017). 
Field, Bonnie, and Kerstin Hamann. “Framing Legislative Bills in Parliament: 
Regional-Nationalist Parties’ Strategies in Spain’s Multinational De-
mocracy”. Party Politics 21, no. 6 (2015): 900-911.
Gillespie, Richard. “The contrasting fortunes of pro-sovereignty currents 
in Basque and Catalan nationalist parties: PNV and CDC compared”. 
Territory, Politics, Governance. Published online 14 September 2016. 
 , and Caroline Gray (eds.). Contesting Spain? The Dynamics of National-
ist Movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country. London: Routledge, 
2015.
Gobierno Vasco. Propuesta de Estatuto Político de la Comunidad de Euskadi. 
2003. Available at: http://estaticos.elmundo.es/documentos/2003/10/
estatuto_vasco.pdf (accessed 1 March 2017). 
Gómez, Braulio, and Laura Cabeza. “Basque Regional Elections 2012: The 
Return of Nationalism under the Influence of the Economic Crisis”. 
Regional & Federal Studies 23, no. 4 (2013): 495-505.
Granja, José Luis de la. Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco. Estatutos 
de autonomía, partidos y elecciones. Historia de Acción Nacionalista Vasca 
1930-1936. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2008.
162 REAF núm. 25, abril 2017, p. 129-165 
Anwen Elias, Ludger Mees
Gray, Caroline. Nationalist Politics and Regional Financing Systems in the Basque 
Country and Catalonia. 2016. Available at: http://www.conciertoeco-
nomico.org/phocadownload/TESIS-Gray-Nationalists-politics.pdf (ac-
cessed 16 February 2017). 
Guibernau, Montserrat. “Secessionism in Catalonia: After Democracy”. Eth-
nopolitics 12, no. 4 (2013): 368-393.
 . “Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country”. Parliamentary Affairs 53, 
no. 1 (2000): 55-68.
 . Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Nationalism and Democracy. London: 
Routledge, 2004. 
Gunther, Richard, José Ramón Montero, and Joan Botella. Democracy in Mod-
ern Spain. New York: Yale University Press, 2004. 
Hepburn, Eve. “Introduction: Re-conceptualizing Sub-state Mobilization”. 
Regional and Federal Studies 19, no. 4-5 (2009): 477-499.
Herrero de Miñón, Miguel. Derechos históricos y Constitución. Madrid: Taurus, 
1998.
ICPS. Sondeig d’opinió Catalunya 1992. 1992. Available at: http://www.icps.cat/
bases-dades-sondeig-opinio-catalunya (accessed 16 November 2015). 
 . Sondeig d’opinió Catalunya 1992. 2003. Available at: http://www.icps.
cat/bases-dades-sondeig-opinio-catalunya (accessed 16 November 2015).
Instituto Nacional de Estadística. “CRE. PIB per cápita (euros)”. 2015. 
Available at: http://www.ine.es/FichasWeb/RegComunidades.do?fi-
chas=49&busc_comu=&botonFichas=Ir+a+la+tabla+de+resultados (ac-
cessed 18 February 2017). 
Jeffery, Charlie, and Dan Hough. “Regional elections in multi-level systems”. 
European Urban and Regional Studies 10, no. 3 (2003): 199-212.
Katz, Richard, and Peter Mair. “The Evolution of Party Organizations in 
Europe: Three Faces of Party Organization”. American Review of Politics: 
Political Parties in a Changing Age, no. 14 Special issue. (William Crotty 
ed., 1994): 593-617.
Keating, Michael, and Zoe Bray. “Renegotiating Sovereignty: Basque Na-
tionalism and the Rise and Fall of the Ibarretxe Plan”. Ethnopolitics 5, 
no. 4 (2006): 347-364.
Kitschelt, Herbert. The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
La Vanguardia. “CDC i UDC aniran per separat al 27-S després d’una rup-
tura ‘sens retorn’”. 19 June 2015. Available at:  http://hemeroteca.
lavanguardia.com/preview/2015/06/19/pagina-14/95569036/pdf.htm-
l?search=CDC%20ultimatum (accessed 3 February 2017). 
163 REAF núm. 25, abril 2017, p. 129-165
Between accommodation and secession: Explaining the shifting territorial goals of nationalist 
parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia
 . “Ranking del déficit fiscal en España por comunidad y habitante”. 
22 July 2015. Available at: http://www.lavanguardia.com/vangda-
ta/20150722/54434059371/ranking-deficit-fiscal-espana.html (accessed 
16 February 2017).
 . “PNV y CiU aseguran que ‘ha llegado el momento de plantearse otro 
modelo de Estado’”. 18 July 2013. Available at: http://www.lavanguardia.
com/local/pais-vasco/20130718/54377646481/pnv-ciu-momento-plant-
earse-otro-modelo-estado.html (accessed 16 February 2017).
Linz, Juan. (1973) “Early state-building and late peripheral nationalisms 
against the state: the case of Spain”. In:  Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, and 
Stein Rokkan (eds.). Building States and Nations, vol. II. Beverly Hills: 
Sage, 1973, 32-116.
Llera, Francisco. Los vascos y la Política. Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 
1994.
Lo Cascio, Paola. Nacionalisme i autogovern. Catalunya, 1980-2003. Barcelona: 
Afers, 2003.
Martí, David, and Daniel Cetrà. “The 2015 Catalan election: a de facto referen-
dum on independence?”. Regional & Federal Studies 26, no. 1 (2016): 107-119. 
Martínez Riera, Meritxell, and Mario Zubiaga. “Nation and State Building 
as Collective Action: A comparative analysis of mechanisms and pro-
cesses in Catalonia and the Basque Country”. Anuari del Conflicte Social 
(2014): 1-36.
Mas, Artur. “Discurs del president en el debat de política general”. 27 
September 2011. Available at:  http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/
docs/2012/11/21/09/09/ff52b0f2-26ab-4732-87c1-617bb9adb133.pdf 
(accessed 3 Feb 2017).
Massetti, Emanuele. “Explaining regionalist party positioning in a multi-di-
mensional ideological space: A framework for analysis”. Regional & Fed-
eral Studies 19, no. 4/5 (2009): 501-531. 
 , and Arjan Schakel. “From Class to Region: How Regionalist Parties 
Link (and Subsume) Left-Right into Centre-Periphery Politics”. Party 
Politics 21, no. 6 (2015): 866-886.
Mazzoleni, Martino. “The Saliency of Regionalization in Party Systems. A Com-
parative Analysis of Regional Decentralization in Party Manifestos”. Par-
ty Politics 15, no. 2 (2009): 199-218.
Mees, Ludger. Nationalism, Violence and Democracy. The Basque Clash of Iden-
tities. New York / Houndmills: Palgrave / Macmillan, 2003.
 . “Visión y gestión. El nacionalismo vasco democrático 1998-2009”. 
In: Walther L. Bernecker, Diego Iñiguez, and Günther Maihold (eds.). 
164 REAF núm. 25, abril 2017, p. 129-165 
Anwen Elias, Ludger Mees
¿Crisis? ¿Qué crisis? España en busca de su camino. Frankfurt: Vervuert, 
2009: 161-205.
 . “El nacionalismo vasco democrático durante la Transición (1974-1981)”. 
In: Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze (ed.). Los partidos en la Transición. Las or-
ganizaciones políticas en la construcción de la democracia española. Madrid: 
Biblioteca Nueva, 2013: 323-343.
 . “Nationalist politics at the crossroads. The Basque Nationalist Party 
and the challenge of sovereignty (1998-2014)”. In: Richard Gillespie, 
and Caroline Gray (eds.). Contesting Spain? The Dynamics of Nationalist 
Movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country. New York: Routledge, 
2015: 41-59.
 . “Rückständiges Zentrum, moderne Peripherie. Probleme des spanis-
chen Nation Building im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert”. In: Christof Dejung, 
and Martin Lengwiler (eds.). Ränder der Moderne. Neue Perspektiven auf 
die Europäische Geschichte (1800-1930). Köln: Böhlau, 2016: 221-245.
Muro, Diego “When do countries recentralize? Ideology and party politics 
in the age of austerity”. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 21, no. 1 (2015): 
24-43. 
Nagel, Klaus Jürgen. “Catalonia’s struggle for self-determination: From re-
gionalism to independence?”. In: Fonkem Achankeng (ed.). Nationalism 
and Intra-State Conflict in Postcolonial Societies. Lexington Books, 2015: 
385-404.
Pablo, Santiago de, José Luis de la Granja, and Ludger Mees. Documentos para 
la historia del nacionalismo vasco. De los Fueros a nuestros días. Barcelona: 
Ariel, 1998.
 , and Ludger Mees. El péndulo patriótico. Historia del Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco (1895-2005). Barcelona: Crítica, 2005.
Pallarés, Francesc, and Michael Keating. “Multi-level Electoral Competition: 
Regional Elections and Party Systems in Spain”. European Urban and 
Regional Studies 10, no. 3 (2003): 239-255. 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco. Compromiso Euskadi. Programa Electoral 2012. 
2012. Available at: www.eaj-pnv.eus/es/adjuntos-documentos/14391/
pdf/programa-electoral-parlamento-vasco-2012 (accessed 27 February 
2017).
Pérez Nievas, Santiago. “The Partido Nacionalista Vasco”. In: Anwen Elias, 
and Filippo Tronconi (eds.). From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and 
the Challenges of Representation. Vienna: Braumuller, 2011.
165 REAF núm. 25, abril 2017, p. 129-165
Between accommodation and secession: Explaining the shifting territorial goals of nationalist 
parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia
 . Modelo de partido y cambio político: el Partido Nacionalista Vasco en el 
proceso de transición y consolidación democrática en el País Vasco. Madrid: 
Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, 2002.
Pujol, Jordi. Tiempo de construir. Memorias (1980-1993). Barcelona: Destino, 
2012.
 . El pensament polític de Jordi Pujol (1980-1987). Barcelona: Planeta, 1988. 
Requejo, Ferran, and Marc Sanjaume. “Recognition and political accommo-
dation: from regionalism to secessionism. The Catalan case”. GRTP 
Working Paper, no. 13 (2013). Available at: https://repositori.upf.edu/
bitstream/handle/10230/20628/GRTPwp13.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 
16 September 2016).
Riba, Clara. “Voto dual y abstención diferencial. Un estudio sobre el com-
portamiento electoral en Cataluña”. Revista Española de Investogaciones 
Sociológicas, no. 91 (2000): 59-87.
Rico, Guillem, and Robert Liñeira. “Bringing secessionism into the main-
stream: The 2012 regional election in Catalonia”. South European Society 
and Politics 19, no. 2 (2012): 257-280. 
Ross, Chris. “Nationalism and party competition in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia”. West European Politics 19, no. 3 (1996): 488-506.
Sociómetro Vasco. Sociómetro Vasco 61. La sociedad vasca ante el futuro. July 
2016. Available at: https://www.euskadi.eus/contenidos/documentac-
ion/sociometro_vasco_61/es_def/adjuntos/16sv61.pdf (accessed 29 Sep-
tember 2016).
 . Sociómetro Vasco 17. Otoño 2001. Available at: https://www.euskadi.
eus/contenidos/informe_estudio/sociometro_vasco_17/es_soc17/adjun-
tos/sv17.pdf (accessed 10 December 2015).
Toubeau, Simon. “Regionalist nationalist parties and constitutional change 
in parliamentary democracies: A framework for analysis”. Regional and 
Federal Studies 21, no. 4-5 (2011): 427-446. 
 , and Emanuele Massetti. “The Party Politics of Territorial Reforms in 
Europe”. West European Politics 36, no. 2 (2013): 297-316. 
Vallès, Josep M. Una agenda imperfecta: amb Maragall i el projecte de canvi. 
Barcelona: Llibres a l’abast, 2008.
Zubiri, Ignacio. “Un analisis del sistema foral y sus ventajas en la crisis”. 2015. 
Available at: http://www.conciertoeconomico.org/joomdocs/autores/
PEE-2015_ZUBIRI-I_Un-analisis-del-sistema-foral-y-sus-ventajas-en-
la-crisis.pdf (accessed 21 February 2017). 
